H.R. 2853 — What to Know Before You Write

Where the bill stands The House passed H.R. 2853 on May 12, 2026, by a vote of 348–60. It is now engrossed and headed to the Senate, where it must clear committee and a floor vote before it can become law. That makes this the moment Oregonians can still weigh in — by contacting Senator Ron Wyden and Senator Jeff Merkley.^[1]

This guide explains, in plain language, what H.R. 2853 would do and lays out the key privacy and civil-liberties talking points you can raise when you email Oregon's two U.S. senators or their staff. It is educational and informational. Use the points that matter most to you, in your own words — personal letters carry more weight than form letters.

01What the Bill Does

H.R. 2853 does two main things. The first is a set of criminal-law changes. The second — and the focus of most privacy concern — is the creation of a new federal coordination center.

It strengthens federal criminal tools for retail and cargo theft.

The bill expands criminal forfeiture, adds theft and stolen-goods offenses (18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 2314, 2315) as money-laundering predicates, treats gift cards and prepaid cards as "monetary instruments," and lets prosecutors meet the $5,000 federal threshold by adding up thefts over a 12-month period rather than needing a single large theft.^[2]

It creates a retail-crime coordination center inside ICE.

The bill directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish an Organized Retail and Supply Chain Crime Coordination Center, with its director appointed by the head of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The Center would coordinate federal investigations, assist state and local police, build relationships with private companies, run an information-sharing system using existing DHS and DOJ databases, and enter agreements with private-sector entities. Its authority sunsets after seven years.^[3]

Worth stating plainly Organized retail and cargo theft are real problems, and the bill drew broad bipartisan support in the House. The question this guide raises is not whether the problem exists — it does — but whether a data-sharing center housed inside ICE should be built without the privacy guardrails that normally accompany this kind of information-sharing infrastructure.

02Key Talking Points

These are the points to raise with Oregon's senators. You don't need all of them — pick two or three that resonate and explain why they matter to you.

Point 01

A retail-theft problem is being handed to an immigration agency.

The Center is placed inside Homeland Security Investigations, with its director appointed by ICE — not a consumer-protection body like the FTC or the Commerce Department. That structural choice means information gathered for retail-crime purposes sits inside the same agency that conducts immigration enforcement.

You might sayI'm concerned that H.R. 2853 places a retail-crime data center inside ICE, and that the bill contains no limits preventing information from being used for immigration enforcement unrelated to the underlying case.

Point 02

It builds a fusion-center-style hub spanning many agencies.

The Center can be staffed by detailees from CBP, the Secret Service, Postal Inspection, ATF, DEA, FBI, and state and local police, and can share resources with other DHS interagency centers. That lets data collected about retail theft move across unrelated enforcement domains — drugs, weapons, immigration, financial crimes — with no clear firewall between them.

You might sayPlease ask what prevents retail-crime data in this Center from being repurposed for unrelated investigations across the many agencies that would have access.

Point 03

It opens direct data pipelines from private companies, with no rules on what flows through them.

The Center is directed to build relationships with retailers and transportation companies and to receive investigative information from them. That could include security-camera footage, license-plate data, facial-recognition leads, loyalty-card and payment records, return histories, and proprietary "organized retail crime" databases — yet the bill never specifies what categories of data can or cannot be shared.

You might sayThe bill should specify what private-sector data the Center may receive, and it should prohibit bulk transfers of customer, shopper, vehicle, or location data.

Point 04

It carves out an exception to a federal confidentiality law.

The bill lets the Center's director personally authorize disclosure of information otherwise protected under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 whenever it is deemed "operationally necessary" — an undefined term. While the approval cannot be delegated, there is no definition of the standard, no after-the-fact review, no notice to affected parties, and no limit on redisclosure.

You might sayThe term "operationally necessary" is undefined and should be narrowed, with logging and after-the-fact review required for any disclosure of otherwise-protected information.

Point 05

The scope language invites mission creep.

The covered-crime definition includes "other crimes related to" the core offenses — open-ended phrasing that could let the Center's reach expand well beyond retail and cargo theft over time.

You might sayPlease ask for a tighter definition of covered crimes, with a clear connection to organized retail or supply-chain theft.

Point 06

The basic privacy guardrails are simply missing.

The bill does not require warrants before sensitive data is shared, data minimization, retention or deletion limits, audit logs of every search, independent civil-liberties audits, redress for people wrongly flagged, public posting of agreements with private companies, or limits on facial recognition, license-plate readers, and location data. A center this broad should carry those protections in the text.

You might sayBefore the Senate advances this bill, it should add data minimization, retention limits, audit logging, independent civil-liberties audits, and a redress process for people wrongly identified.

Point 07

Strengthen what's already good in the bill.

The bill does include a seven-year sunset, a non-delegable approval requirement for confidential disclosures, and annual public trend reports — all worth keeping. But seven years is long enough for a surveillance system to become permanent in practice, and the required reports cover enforcement results rather than civil-liberties impacts.

You might sayI'd urge a shorter reauthorization window — three years instead of seven — with a public civil-liberties audit before any renewal, and reporting that includes the number of U.S. persons affected and any immigration referrals.

03Who to Contact

Oregon is represented in the U.S. Senate by two senators. Both will vote on whether this bill advances. Contacting either or both — by email, phone, or their web contact form — puts your concerns on the record.^[4]

Sen. Ron Wyden

Democrat · Oregon · Senior Senator

Web contact form: wyden.senate.gov/contact/email-ron
D.C. office: (202) 224-5244
Bend field office: (541) 330-9142

Sen. Jeff Merkley

Democrat · Oregon · Junior Senator

Web contact form: merkley.senate.gov/connect/contact
D.C. office: (202) 224-3753
Bend field office: (541) 318-1298

Contact details confirmed against each senator's official Senate website on May 27, 2026. Both senators maintain field offices in Bend's Jamison Building. The web contact forms route your message to the staff who track this issue and are the most reliable channel.

04How to Write an Effective Message

Subject

Privacy concerns with H.R. 2853 — please seek amendments

Message

Dear Senator [Wyden / Merkley],

I'm a constituent writing from [your city], Oregon. I'm contacting you about H.R. 2853, the Combating Organized Retail Crime Act of 2025, which the House passed on May 12 and which is now before the Senate.

I understand organized retail and cargo theft are real problems. My concern is the new coordination center the bill creates inside ICE. As written, the bill places a data-sharing hub inside an immigration-enforcement agency, opens direct data pipelines from private retailers without specifying what data can be shared, and leaves out basic safeguards like data minimization, retention limits, audit logs, and a way for wrongly flagged people to seek correction.

Before this bill advances, I'd ask you to push for those privacy protections to be written into the text, to narrow the undefined "operationally necessary" disclosure standard, and to support a shorter reauthorization window with a public civil-liberties audit before any renewal.

Could you let me know where you stand on adding these safeguards? Thank you for your time.

Sincerely,
[Your name]
[Your city], Oregon

This guide is educational and informational. It summarizes publicly available legislative text and reporting on H.R. 2853 as of May 27, 2026, and reflects a privacy and civil-liberties reading of the bill. It is not legal advice. Bill status and the text of H.R. 2853 can change as it moves through the Senate; verify the current version at congress.gov before relying on specific provisions.

Sources

[1] H.R. 2853 status and House vote (348–60, May 12, 2026): Congress.gov; engrossed-in-House text: GovInfo.
[2] Criminal-law provisions (forfeiture, money-laundering predicates, gift-card coverage, 12-month aggregation): bill text via GovTrack and CBO cost estimate, cbo.gov.
[3] Coordination Center, ICE placement, duties, and seven-year sunset: bill text; CBO estimate.
[4] Oregon's U.S. senators and office contact details confirmed via each senator's official site: wyden.senate.gov and merkley.senate.gov.

Bend Privacy Alliance