jonathanwestmoreland.com

Category: Surveillance Oversight

Public education and local accountability resources on police technology, surveillance systems, data retention, vendor access, AI tools, automated license plate readers, and safeguards for transparency, privacy, and democratic oversight in Bend, Oregon.

  • Questions Bend Residents Can Ask Council

    Questions Bend Residents Can Ask Council

    Part 10 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    You do not need to be a surveillance expert to ask reasonable questions about public technology.

    If a city uses tools that collect, store, search, analyze, or share public data, residents have a right to understand how those tools are governed.

    That applies to body cameras, fleet cameras, automated license plate readers, drones, traffic enforcement cameras, digital evidence systems, AI tools, real-time information platforms, and any other technology that affects public privacy, public records, or public accountability.

    The goal is not to attack City staff or police.

    The goal is simple:

    Public safety technology should answer to public rules.

    1. What systems exist?

    • What surveillance technologies does Bend Police currently use?
    • What systems are being considered for future use?
    • Which systems are active now?
    • Which systems are approved but not yet active?
    • Which systems are optional add-ons or future capabilities?
    • Which vendors are involved?
    • Are there third-party vendors, subcontractors, cloud providers, or software modules the public should know about?
    • Is there a plain-language public inventory residents can read?

    2. What data is collected?

    • Does the system collect video?
    • Does it collect audio?
    • Does it collect license plate data?
    • Does it collect location data?
    • Does it collect metadata?
    • Does it collect biometric data?
    • Does it analyze faces, vehicles, objects, movement, behavior, or patterns?
    • Is any data analyzed by AI or automated tools?
    • Are any features disabled but technically available?

    3. Where does the data go?

    • Where is the data stored?
    • Is it stored on City systems or vendor-controlled cloud systems?
    • Does the City own and control the data?
    • Can vendors access the data?
    • Can vendors process, export, or analyze the data?
    • Are cloud providers or subprocessors involved?
    • Can data be stored outside Oregon?
    • Can data be stored outside the United States?
    • What happens to the data when the contract ends?

    4. How long is the data kept?

    • What is the default retention period for each system?
    • Is non-evidence data automatically deleted?
    • Is non-hit ALPR data deleted quickly?
    • Who can extend retention?
    • What justification is required to extend retention?
    • Are retention changes logged?
    • Are retention settings audited?
    • Does the City publish retention rules publicly?

    5. Who can search the data?

    • Who has access to each system?
    • Are users limited by role?
    • Can every officer search the system?
    • Can supervisors search it?
    • Can dispatch search it?
    • Can prosecutors access it directly?
    • Can vendors access it?
    • Can outside agencies access it?
    • Are searches required to include a case number or incident number?
    • Are searches required to include a purpose?
    • Are all searches logged?
    • Are search logs audited?
    • What happens if someone searches improperly?

    6. Can outside agencies access it?

    • Can federal agencies access Bend surveillance data?
    • Can out-of-state agencies access it?
    • Can regional law enforcement systems access it?
    • Can fusion centers access it?
    • Can private companies access it?
    • Can vendors respond directly to outside requests?
    • Does the City require case-specific legal process before sharing?
    • Does the City require written authorization before sharing?
    • Does the City publish annual data-sharing statistics?
    • Can the City deny outside requests?
    • Can the City audit outside access?

    7. Can vendors activate new features?

    • Can vendors activate new AI features?
    • Can vendors activate analytics features?
    • Can vendors activate biometric tools?
    • Can vendors activate ALPR features?
    • Can vendors activate real-time monitoring?
    • Can vendors change retention settings?
    • Can vendors change data-sharing settings?
    • Does Council approval happen before new capabilities are enabled?
    • Does the public receive notice before major feature changes?
    • Are disabled features independently verified?

    8. What about facial recognition and biometrics?

    • Does Bend use facial recognition?
    • Does Bend plan to use facial recognition?
    • Do any current systems have facial recognition capability?
    • Are biometric features disabled?
    • Who verifies that they are disabled?
    • Would Council approval be required before biometric features are activated?
    • Would the public receive notice?
    • Would there be legal review and technical review first?

    A simple local rule would be:

    No facial recognition or biometric identification without explicit public approval.

    9. What about AI police reports?

    • Does Bend use AI-assisted police reports?
    • Does Bend plan to use AI-assisted police reports?
    • If AI is used, are original AI drafts preserved?
    • Are officer edits logged?
    • Does the final report disclose AI assistance?
    • Are prosecutors notified when AI was used?
    • Can defense attorneys obtain AI drafting records through normal discovery?
    • Can the vendor use Bend data to train AI models?
    • Has the system been independently audited?
    • Are serious incidents excluded or subject to extra safeguards?

    A simple local rule would be:

    No AI-generated police report without an audit trail.

    10. What oversight exists?

    • Has the City conducted an independent technical audit?
    • Does each system have a public use policy?
    • Does each system have a public retention policy?
    • Does each system have a public sharing policy?
    • Are complaints tracked?
    • Are violations reported publicly in aggregate?
    • Does Council review surveillance systems before renewal?
    • Does the City publish annual transparency reports?
    • Are total annual costs publicly reported?
    • Are future renewals and expansions clearly identified?

    11. What safeguards will Bend adopt?

    • Will Bend adopt a surveillance technology ordinance?
    • Will Bend require Council approval before acquisition or expansion?
    • Will Bend publish a public inventory of all surveillance technologies?
    • Will Bend require public use policies before deployment?
    • Will Bend set short retention limits?
    • Will Bend require logged searches with case numbers?
    • Will Bend restrict federal and third-party sharing?
    • Will Bend prohibit facial recognition without explicit public approval?
    • Will Bend require independent technical audits?
    • Will Bend require annual public transparency reports?
    • Will Bend prohibit vendors from activating new capabilities without City approval?
    • Will Bend require public review before contract renewal?

    A short version residents can send

    Residents who want to keep it simple can ask Council this:

    Before Bend expands police surveillance technology, will the City publish a plain-language inventory of all systems, identify what data each system collects, explain where the data is stored, disclose retention periods, require logged searches with case numbers, restrict federal and third-party sharing, prohibit facial recognition without explicit public approval, and require annual public transparency reports?

    These are not anti-police questions.

    They are public governance questions.

    If a technology is powerful enough to collect, search, store, analyze, or share public data, it is powerful enough to deserve public rules.

    Bend residents deserve clear answers before police surveillance systems expand.

    Further reading

    Series links

  • What Reasonable Safeguards Would Look Like in Bend

    What Reasonable Safeguards Would Look Like in Bend

    Part 9 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    This does not have to be a yes-or-no fight over police technology.

    Bend can support legitimate public safety tools while still requiring strong public oversight.

    The real question is not whether technology should ever be used.

    The real question is whether powerful systems are governed by clear public rules before they expand.

    Body cameras, fleet cameras, ALPRs, drones, traffic enforcement cameras, digital evidence systems, AI tools, and real-time information platforms all raise different questions.

    But they also share a common issue:

    They collect, store, search, analyze, or share public data.

    That means Bend should have a citywide surveillance technology policy.

    Not a vague promise.

    Not vendor assurances.

    Not scattered contract language.

    Not internal rules that residents cannot easily find.

    A clear public framework.

    1. Public inventory of surveillance technologies

    Bend should publish a plain-language inventory of all police surveillance technologies.

    That inventory should identify:

    • the technology name,
    • the vendor,
    • the department using it,
    • the purpose of the system,
    • what data it collects,
    • where the data is stored,
    • how long the data is retained,
    • who can access it,
    • whether outside agencies can access it,
    • whether vendors or subcontractors can access it, and
    • whether any AI, biometric, analytics, or automated decision features are enabled or available.

    Residents should not need to search scattered agendas, contracts, staff reports, and vendor documents to understand what systems exist.

    2. Council approval before acquisition or expansion

    Bend should require Council approval before any department acquires, renews, expands, or materially changes surveillance technology.

    That should include new tools, new vendors, major software modules, AI features, biometric capabilities, data-sharing expansions, and contract amendments that materially change what a system can do.

    Public approval should happen before deployment, not after the system is already operating.

    3. Public use policy before deployment

    Every surveillance technology should have a public use policy before it is deployed.

    That policy should explain:

    • the approved purpose,
    • allowed uses,
    • prohibited uses,
    • data collection rules,
    • retention rules,
    • access rules,
    • sharing rules,
    • audit procedures,
    • disciplinary consequences for misuse, and
    • how residents can find annual reports.

    The public should be able to read the rules before the technology is used.

    4. Short retention for non-evidence data

    Data retention should be limited.

    For non-evidence data, the default should be deletion after a short period unless the data is tied to a specific, documented case.

    For ALPR data, I would support a default rule like this:

    Non-hit ALPR data should automatically delete within 72 hours unless it is tied to a documented case, warrant, stolen vehicle, active investigation, or legally valid evidentiary need.

    Short retention allows legitimate use while reducing the risk that ordinary residents’ movements become long-term searchable records.

    5. Logged searches with case numbers

    If a system can be searched, every search should be logged.

    The log should identify:

    • who searched,
    • when they searched,
    • what they searched,
    • why they searched,
    • the case number or incident number,
    • whether the search produced a result, and
    • whether the result was shared.

    Search logs protect the public from misuse.

    They also protect officers who use the system properly.

    6. Limits on federal, out-of-state, private, and vendor access

    Local surveillance data should not become outside-agency data by default.

    Bend should limit access by federal agencies, out-of-state agencies, private companies, vendors, subcontractors, fusion centers, and other third parties.

    Access should require a documented purpose, legal authority, written authorization, and an auditable record.

    Broad sharing, informal access, and bulk access should be prohibited unless explicitly approved through a public process and consistent with law.

    7. No facial recognition or biometric identification without explicit approval

    Bend should prohibit facial recognition, biometric identification, biometric analytics, or similar identity-matching tools unless Council explicitly approves them after public notice, public debate, legal review, and technical assessment.

    If a system is technically capable of biometric analysis but the City says the feature is disabled, that should be independently verified.

    Disabled features should not become active through a quiet software update or vendor configuration change.

    8. AI report-writing rules

    If Bend ever uses AI to help draft police reports, the City should require strict auditability.

    The basic rule is simple:

    No AI-generated police report without an audit trail.

    That means preserving original AI drafts, officer edits, source transcripts, timestamps, final reports, supervisor edits, and disclosure that AI was used.

    Prosecutors and defense attorneys should be able to obtain relevant records through normal legal processes.

    9. Independent technical audits

    Bend should not rely only on vendor assurances.

    The City should require independent technical audits of surveillance systems.

    Audits should verify:

    • enabled features,
    • disabled features,
    • retention settings,
    • sharing settings,
    • access controls,
    • security controls,
    • vendor access,
    • subprocessor access, and
    • compliance with City policy.

    Trust is strongest when systems can be independently checked.

    10. Annual public transparency reports

    Bend should publish annual surveillance transparency reports.

    Those reports should include:

    • what systems were used,
    • what new systems were acquired,
    • how many searches occurred,
    • how many outside requests were received,
    • how many requests were approved or denied,
    • how many audits were performed,
    • whether misuse was found,
    • whether any new features were activated,
    • whether policies changed, and
    • what the total annual costs were.

    Transparency reports do not need to reveal sensitive case details.

    They should provide enough aggregate information for residents and elected officials to know whether the rules are working.

    11. Contract terms that match public policy

    Contracts should not undermine policy.

    If Bend adopts public rules, vendor contracts should match those rules.

    Contracts should prohibit vendors from changing settings, enabling features, expanding sharing, using data for product development, or using local public safety data for AI training unless the City explicitly approves it through the required public process.

    Good policy should be backed by enforceable contract language.

    12. Public review before renewal

    Surveillance technology should not renew automatically without public review.

    Before renewal, the City should publish a report explaining how the system was used, whether it met its stated purpose, what it cost, whether misuse occurred, whether audits were completed, and whether stronger safeguards are needed.

    Renewal should be a public decision, not an automatic default.

    The basic framework

    A reasonable Bend surveillance policy could be summarized like this:

    • Tell the public what systems exist.
    • Require approval before expansion.
    • Limit retention.
    • Log searches.
    • Restrict sharing.
    • Control vendor access.
    • Ban biometric use without explicit approval.
    • Audit AI tools.
    • Verify systems independently.
    • Report to the public every year.

    That is not anti-police.

    That is responsible governance.

    Powerful public safety tools should answer to public rules.

    Further reading

    Series links

  • Other Cities Are Already Asking Better Questions

    Other Cities Are Already Asking Better Questions

    Part 8 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    Bend does not need to invent police surveillance oversight from scratch.

    Other cities are already asking the same basic questions:

    • Who approves surveillance technology before it is used?
    • What data is collected?
    • How long is it kept?
    • Who can search it?
    • Can outside agencies access it?
    • Can vendors change settings or activate new features?
    • Does the public receive annual reports?
    • Can elected officials review the system before it expands?

    That is the important lesson.

    The issue is not whether every city has reached the same conclusion.

    They have not.

    The issue is that communities across the country are realizing that police technology should not expand faster than public oversight.

    Austin: surveillance technology should require public rules

    Austin offers one useful model.

    In February 2026, the Austin City Council passed a resolution called the Transparent and Responsible Use of Surveillance Technology Act, or TRUST Act.

    The resolution directed the City Manager to return with an ordinance regulating the adoption, acquisition, deployment, use, and review of surveillance technology by city departments.

    That matters because it shifts the question from one contract at a time to a broader public framework.

    Bend could take the same approach.

    The public question should not only be whether a single contract sounds reasonable.

    The broader question should be what rules apply before surveillance technology is acquired, expanded, renewed, or materially changed.

    Mountain View: vendor assurances were not enough

    Mountain View, California offers another useful lesson.

    In January 2026, the City publicly stated that it had discovered unauthorized queries and potential access to Mountain View ALPR data.

    The City said Police Department staff had met with Flock Safety leadership about “the security and control of our data,” and said it was “upset and disappointed with how our data was accessed.”

    That example matters because it shows why vendor assurances are not enough.

    The lesson for Bend is simple:

    Do not wait for a data-sharing problem before creating data-sharing rules.

    Pima County: cost and AI concerns can cross political lines

    Pima County, Arizona offers another example.

    Reporting in early 2026 described the Pima County Board of Supervisors rejecting a proposed $45 million contract expansion involving Axon technology and AI tools.

    Reported concerns included cost, AI expansion, and whether the investment made sense for the Sheriff’s Department.

    That example matters because surveillance oversight is not only a privacy issue.

    It is also a budget issue.

    Public safety dollars are limited.

    Every dollar spent on bundled technology, AI tools, cloud subscriptions, hardware refreshes, and add-on features is a dollar not spent somewhere else.

    That does not mean technology is never worth funding.

    It means elected officials should ask hard questions before long-term commitments become automatic.

    Ferndale: public pressure can lead to stronger oversight

    Ferndale, Michigan offers another useful example based on reporting about local ALPR oversight discussions.

    Reporting described residents raising concerns about license plate reader expansion and city officials discussing stronger policies.

    That is important because public oversight often improves when residents ask specific, grounded questions.

    Community engagement does not have to stop technology.

    It can improve the rules that govern technology.

    The pattern is bigger than one vendor

    This is not only about Axon.

    It is not only about Flock.

    It is not only about ALPRs.

    It is not only about body cameras.

    It is not only about AI.

    The larger issue is how cities govern powerful surveillance systems once cameras, cloud storage, software subscriptions, data-sharing, analytics, and vendor platforms become part of public safety operations.

    A city can support public safety and still insist on public oversight.

    Those goals are not opposites.

    What Bend can learn

    Bend can learn at least five things from other cities.

    1. Oversight should happen before deployment or expansion, not after controversy.
    2. Citywide rules are better than one-off contract debates.
    3. Data-sharing limits should be explicit and enforceable.
    4. Vendors should not be the only source of truth about how systems work.
    5. Annual public reporting builds trust without exposing sensitive case details.

    These examples do not prove that Bend has the same problems.

    They show why Bend should adopt safeguards before problems occur.

    Bend can ask better questions now

    Police technology can be useful.

    But useful tools still need rules.

    If other cities are asking stronger questions about surveillance technology, Bend can too.

    The question is not whether Bend should copy another city word for word.

    The question is whether Bend should create its own public framework before future expansions become harder to unwind.

    Better questions today can prevent harder problems tomorrow.

    Further reading

    Series links

  • Why Federal and Third-Party Sharing Matters

    Why Federal and Third-Party Sharing Matters

    Part 7 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    In the last post, I wrote about why ALPR scans are location records.

    A license plate reader does not just capture a plate number.

    It creates a record that a specific vehicle was seen at a specific place at a specific time.

    But there is a second question that matters just as much:

    Once a city collects surveillance data, does that data stay local?

    That question applies to ALPRs, body cameras, fleet cameras, drone video, real-time information platforms, traffic cameras, evidence systems, and other police technology.

    The concern is not only what Bend collects.

    The concern is who else can access it.

    Local data can become outside-agency data

    A resident may feel differently about local police using a tool for a specific local purpose than they do about that same data becoming available to state agencies, federal agencies, out-of-state agencies, fusion centers, private vendors, or other third parties.

    Public consent for one local use should not be treated as consent for every future use.

    That is why data-sharing rules should be explicit before technology expands.

    Local data should not become outside-agency data by default.

    The policy should be explicit

    Data-sharing rules should not be vague.

    A policy that says information may be shared “for law enforcement purposes” may sound reasonable, but it can be extremely broad.

    A stronger policy should say exactly:

    • who may access the data,
    • for what purpose,
    • under what legal authority,
    • with whose approval,
    • with what documentation,
    • for how long,
    • whether access is logged,
    • whether the public will receive aggregate reporting, and
    • whether the request can be denied.

    If the policy does not clearly prohibit broad sharing, residents cannot know where local surveillance data may eventually go.

    That uncertainty is the problem.

    Federal access requires special caution

    Federal access deserves special attention because federal priorities can change quickly.

    Local residents may support local public safety uses while objecting to unrelated federal uses, especially if those uses involve immigration enforcement, political activity, protests, reproductive health travel, religious activity, or other sensitive areas.

    A strong policy would say:

    Bend surveillance data may not be shared with federal agencies unless there is case-specific legal process, written City authorization, a documented local purpose, and an auditable record.

    That rule would not prevent lawful cooperation in a serious case.

    It would prevent broad, informal, or routine access.

    Vendor access is also third-party access

    Third-party sharing is not only about government agencies.

    Vendors are third parties too.

    If a private company hosts police data, maintains the software, provides analytics, troubleshoots systems, stores video, processes license plate reads, or manages user access, that company may have some level of technical access to the system.

    That access should be limited, logged, and auditable.

    Vendor access should never be a black box.

    Contracts should clearly define when a vendor can access data, what the vendor can do with it, whether subcontractors are involved, whether data can be used for product development or AI training, and how the City verifies compliance.

    Outside sharing can create long-term consequences

    Once data leaves a local system, it may be harder to control.

    It may be copied, retained, searched again, combined with other databases, or used for purposes residents never debated locally.

    That is why sharing limits need to be set before sharing occurs.

    The point is not to block legitimate, case-specific cooperation.

    The point is to prevent broad access, informal access, bulk sharing, or secondary uses that bypass local democratic oversight.

    What a stronger local rule could require

    A stronger Bend policy would require:

    • case-specific legal process for outside-agency access,
    • written City authorization before sharing,
    • a documented purpose for every request,
    • a case number or incident number when applicable,
    • logs showing what was shared and with whom,
    • limits on vendor access and subcontractor access,
    • prohibitions on bulk or informal sharing,
    • clear retention limits after data is shared, and
    • annual public reporting in aggregate form.

    These safeguards would not prevent legitimate public safety work.

    They would make sure powerful data-sharing systems answer to public rules.

    The basic principle

    Local surveillance data should not become outside-agency data by default.

    If Bend collects police technology data, the City should clearly define who can access it, when it can be shared, how sharing is approved, how access is logged, and how the public can verify that the rules are being followed.

    The solution is not complicated:

    No broad sharing. No informal access. No vendor black boxes. No federal access without case-specific process. Public reporting every year.

    That is how local control becomes real.

    Further reading

    Series links

  • ALPRs: License Plate Scans Are Location Records

    ALPRs: License Plate Scans Are Location Records

    Part 6 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    An automated license plate reader does not just capture a plate number.

    It creates a time-and-place record.

    And when many scans are collected over time, those records can reveal patterns about where a vehicle has been, when it was there, and how often it appeared in certain places.

    That is why ALPR data should be treated as location data.

    It is not “just a plate.”

    It is a record of movement.

    What an ALPR scan actually records

    An ALPR system typically captures:

    • the license plate number,
    • the date and time of the scan,
    • the location of the camera,
    • an image of the plate or vehicle, and sometimes
    • additional metadata about the scan.

    One scan by itself may not say much.

    But multiple scans over time can create a much richer picture.

    If a vehicle is scanned near a home, workplace, school, clinic, place of worship, political event, protest, or support meeting, the scans may reveal sensitive patterns about a person’s life.

    That is why ALPR data deserves careful limits.

    Patterns matter more than single scans

    The privacy issue is not only the plate number.

    The privacy issue is the pattern.

    A series of scans can show where a vehicle travels, how often it visits certain places, what route it takes, when it leaves, when it returns, and whether those movements change over time.

    That is a form of location tracking.

    Even if each individual scan appears routine, the system as a whole can become highly revealing.

    That is why retention periods, search rules, and sharing rules matter so much.

    This post does not claim Bend currently uses fixed ALPR technology

    This post does not claim that Bend currently uses fixed automated license plate reader technology.

    The point is broader: if Bend adopts fixed ALPRs in the future, or if related systems create similar location records, the City should have clear rules in place before deployment.

    Oversight should come first, not later.

    Short retention should be the default

    If ALPR data is retained for long periods, it becomes easier to reconstruct a person’s travel history.

    The longer the data is kept, the more it can be searched, shared, or misused later.

    A reasonable rule would be:

    Delete ALPR scans quickly unless they are tied to a legitimate, documented case.

    I would support a default retention period as short as 72 hours unless the scan is associated with a specific investigative need such as a stolen vehicle, warrant hit, active case, or clearly documented law enforcement purpose.

    That kind of rule allows legitimate use while reducing unnecessary long-term accumulation.

    Every search should be logged

    If ALPR data can be searched, every search should leave a record.

    That record should show:

    • who conducted the search,
    • when it was conducted,
    • what plate or data was searched,
    • the case number or incident number,
    • the reason for the search, and
    • whether the results were shared.

    Without logs, the public has to trust that the system is being used properly.

    With logs, the City can verify that the rules are being followed.

    Sharing should be limited and documented

    ALPR data should not flow freely to outside agencies, vendors, private companies, or federal systems without clear public rules.

    A strong policy would require:

    • a specific legal basis for sharing,
    • a documented case-related purpose,
    • written authorization,
    • an auditable record of what was shared and with whom, and
    • clear limits on bulk or informal access.

    The issue is not whether legitimate case-specific sharing can occur.

    The issue is whether local location data becomes broadly accessible by default.

    Public reports build trust

    If Bend ever uses ALPRs, the City should publish annual public reports showing:

    • how many cameras or systems were used,
    • how many scans were collected,
    • how long data was retained,
    • how many searches were conducted,
    • how many shares occurred,
    • how many outside-agency requests were received,
    • how many requests were granted or denied, and
    • whether any misuse or policy violations were found.

    These reports do not need to expose sensitive investigative details.

    They should provide enough information for residents and elected officials to understand how the system is working.

    The basic principle

    An ALPR scan is not just a plate number.

    It is a location record.

    And location records deserve strong safeguards.

    Short retention. Logged searches. Clear sharing limits. Public oversight.

    Those are not extreme demands.

    They are basic rules for a powerful system.

    Further reading

    Series links

  • AI Police Reports and the Audit Problem

    AI Police Reports and the Audit Problem

    Part 5 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    Police reports are not ordinary paperwork.

    They can shape criminal charges, court proceedings, plea negotiations, public records, insurance claims, disciplinary reviews, and a person’s ability to defend themselves.

    That is why AI-generated police reports deserve careful public oversight.

    The issue is not whether officers should use better tools.

    The issue is whether official police records remain accurate, reviewable, and auditable when artificial intelligence is involved.

    What AI police report tools do

    AI police report tools can use body-camera audio, transcripts, officer input, or other records to generate a draft narrative.

    That may sound helpful.

    Police officers spend a lot of time writing reports, and many departments are looking for tools that reduce paperwork.

    But a police report is not just a summary.

    It is an official law enforcement record.

    If AI helps write that record, the public should know:

    • what information the AI used,
    • what the AI produced,
    • what the officer changed,
    • whether the officer verified every factual statement,
    • whether the original AI draft was preserved,
    • whether errors can be reconstructed later, and
    • whether defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, or oversight bodies can review the process.

    Without those safeguards, AI report-writing creates a serious audit problem.

    Why the original AI draft matters

    Imagine an AI tool creates a draft police report from body-camera audio.

    The officer reads it, edits it, and copies the final text into the official report system.

    Then the original AI draft disappears.

    Later, a defendant, attorney, judge, journalist, auditor, or oversight board wants to know whether a questionable sentence came from the officer, the transcript, or the AI system.

    If the original AI draft was not preserved, there may be no way to answer that question.

    That is the core problem.

    The concern is not only that AI can make mistakes.

    The concern is that AI mistakes may become embedded in official records without leaving a trace.

    What a basic audit trail should include

    A reasonable AI police report policy should require preservation of:

    • the original AI-generated draft,
    • the body-camera audio or transcript used to generate it,
    • the prompt or settings used,
    • timestamps,
    • the officer’s edits,
    • the final submitted report,
    • supervisor edits if any, and
    • a clear label showing that AI assisted in the drafting process.

    This should not be controversial.

    If AI saves time and improves accuracy, the audit trail should show that.

    If AI introduces errors, the audit trail should make those errors detectable.

    Either way, preserving the record protects the public, defendants, officers, prosecutors, and the City.

    Bend should set rules before using AI reports

    This post does not claim that Bend currently uses AI-assisted police report-writing.

    The point is that AI report-writing is already being marketed to law enforcement agencies, and cities should set rules before these tools become routine.

    Bend should not wait until after AI-generated police reports become common to decide how they should be governed.

    A strong local policy would say:

    1. No AI-generated police report may be submitted without officer review and certification.
    2. The original AI-generated draft must be preserved.
    3. All officer edits must be logged.
    4. The report must disclose that AI assisted in drafting.
    5. Prosecutors must be notified when AI was used.
    6. Defense attorneys must be able to obtain relevant AI drafting records through normal discovery.
    7. AI report tools may not be used for serious incidents unless additional safeguards are in place.
    8. The City must publish annual statistics on AI report use, error findings, officer adoption, and measured time savings.
    9. The vendor may not use Bend data to train AI models without explicit public approval.
    10. The City must independently audit the system before and after deployment.

    These rules would not ban AI.

    They would make AI accountable.

    No AI-generated police report without an audit trail

    Police reports are too important to become black boxes.

    If AI helps write an official record, the original AI output should not vanish.

    Bend residents should expect a simple rule:

    No AI-generated police report without an audit trail.

    Further reading

    Series links

  • What Happens to the Data?

    What Happens to the Data?

    Part 4 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    When people talk about police cameras, the conversation often focuses on the camera itself.

    But the camera is only the beginning.

    The more important question is what happens after data is collected.

    • Where does the video go?
    • Who stores it?
    • How long is it kept?
    • Who can search it?
    • Can it be shared?
    • Can vendors access it?
    • Can outside agencies access it?
    • Are searches logged?
    • Can the data be used later for a different purpose?

    These are the questions that turn a camera discussion into a public oversight discussion.

    Collection is only step one

    A body camera, vehicle camera, drone, traffic camera, or license plate reader may collect video, audio, images, license plate data, metadata, location information, timestamps, or other records.

    But collection is only the first step.

    After that, data may be uploaded to cloud storage, attached to case files, searched by officers, shared with prosecutors, retained for years, reviewed by supervisors, exported for court, or combined with other systems.

    A technology policy that says “we use cameras” is not enough.

    The real policy should explain what data is collected, where it is stored, how long it is retained, who can access it, when it can be searched, whether searches require a case number, whether searches are audited, whether vendors can access it, whether outside agencies can access it, whether data can be used for AI training or analytics, and whether new uses require public approval.

    Cloud storage changes the oversight question

    Many modern police technology systems rely on cloud storage and vendor-managed software.

    That can be useful.

    Cloud systems can make evidence easier to organize, share, redact, and preserve.

    But cloud storage also changes the oversight question.

    If public safety data is stored in a vendor-controlled system, residents should know what contractual rules apply.

    They should know whether the City owns the data, whether the vendor can access it, whether subcontractors are involved, whether data is encrypted, and whether the City can independently verify how the system is configured.

    This is why public policy should not rely only on verbal assurances.

    The City should publish the actual rules.

    Retention matters

    Retention is one of the most important privacy questions.

    A camera that records something and deletes it quickly is very different from a system that keeps searchable records for months or years.

    The longer data is kept, the more it can be searched later, shared later, misused later, breached later, or repurposed later.

    For Bend, a reasonable policy would be:

    Delete non-evidence data by default after a short period unless it is flagged for a specific, documented case.

    For ALPR data, I would support a default deletion period as short as 72 hours unless the scan is tied to a legitimate case, hit, warrant, stolen vehicle, or documented investigation.

    Search logs should be mandatory

    If a police technology system can be searched, the search should leave a record.

    That record should show who searched, when they searched, what they searched, why they searched, the case number or incident number, whether the search produced a result, and whether the result was shared.

    Without search logs, the public has to trust that the system is only being used properly.

    With search logs, the City can verify whether the system is being used properly.

    This protects the public.

    It also protects officers who are using the system appropriately.

    Sharing rules should be explicit

    Data-sharing rules should not be vague.

    A policy that says data may be shared “for law enforcement purposes” may sound reasonable, but it can be very broad.

    A stronger policy would say that surveillance data may not be shared with federal agencies, out-of-state agencies, private companies, or other third parties unless there is a specific legal basis, a documented case number, written authorization, and an auditable record.

    The point is not to prevent legitimate case-specific cooperation.

    The point is to prevent broad, informal, or automatic access to local surveillance data without clear public rules.

    Vendor access should not be a black box

    Vendor access is also a form of third-party access.

    If a private company hosts police data, manages software, provides analytics, troubleshoots systems, stores video, or controls user permissions, the public should know what limits apply.

    Vendor access should be limited, logged, and auditable.

    Contracts should make clear that vendors cannot use local public safety data for unrelated purposes, product development, AI training, or secondary analysis without explicit public approval.

    Public reports build trust

    The City should publish annual transparency reports for police surveillance systems.

    Those reports should include:

    • what systems were used,
    • how many searches were conducted,
    • how many times data was shared,
    • how many outside-agency requests were received,
    • how many requests were approved or denied,
    • how many audits were conducted,
    • whether any misuse was found,
    • whether any new features were activated, and
    • whether any policies changed.

    These reports do not need to expose sensitive case details.

    They should provide enough aggregate information for residents and elected officials to understand whether the rules are working.

    The basic principle

    The goal is not to prevent every use of technology.

    The goal is to make sure powerful tools answer to public rules.

    A camera policy should not stop at collection.

    It should follow the data.

    Where it goes, how long it stays, who can search it, who can share it, and how the public can verify the rules are being followed.

    Further reading

    Series links

  • Why Vendor Lock-In Matters in Police Technology Contracts

    Why Vendor Lock-In Matters in Police Technology Contracts

    Part 3 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    In the last post, we looked at the range of police technology Bend has already considered, approved, or discussed: body-worn cameras, fleet cameras, digital evidence storage, Fusus real-time information software, Axon Air drone software, third-party video playback, investigation software, VR training, and automated traffic enforcement cameras.

    Looked at one at a time, each purchase can sound narrow.

    But when the same vendor ecosystem provides the cameras, storage, software, subscriptions, hardware refreshes, training tools, review tools, and add-on features, the City may gradually become dependent on one platform.

    That is called vendor lock-in.

    Vendor lock-in does not necessarily mean anyone did anything wrong.

    It means a city’s systems, data, workflows, training, contracts, and budgets become so tied to one vendor that switching later becomes expensive, disruptive, or politically difficult.

    That matters for public oversight.

    How lock-in happens

    A city might begin with a legitimate need: body cameras.

    Then it needs a place to store the video, so it adds cloud evidence storage.

    Then prosecutors need access, so the system becomes part of the criminal justice workflow.

    Then patrol vehicles need cameras, so fleet cameras are added.

    Then drone video needs to be managed, so drone software is added.

    Then the department wants video review tools, third-party video playback, investigation software, AI tools, or real-time information platforms.

    Over time, what began as a camera contract can become a broad public safety software ecosystem.

    The Electronic Frontier Foundation has warned about this pattern in its article “Beware the Bundle”, which describes how police technology companies can use bundled offerings to become a department’s default provider for more and more tools.

    Again, the issue is not whether any single tool is useful.

    The issue is whether the public understands how the tools fit together before the City becomes deeply dependent on the platform.

    Why bundled contracts are harder to oversee

    Bundled contracts can make public oversight harder for several reasons.

    First, bundles can obscure what is actually being purchased.

    Second, bundles can make costs harder to compare.

    Third, bundles can reduce practical competition.

    Fourth, bundles can normalize expansion through amendments.

    That is how surveillance systems can grow without residents ever seeing a single clear moment where the full policy question is debated.

    Vendor assurances are not the same as public policy

    Cities often rely on vendor statements about what a system does or does not do.

    That is not enough.

    • Vendors can change product features.
    • Software capabilities can be added later.
    • Terms can change.
    • Subprocessors can be involved.
    • Data can be stored in complex cloud systems.
    • Departments can expand use over time.
    • Future renewals can make earlier decisions harder to revisit.

    That is why public rules should not depend only on vendor assurances or internal department practices.

    Public policy should be clear enough that residents can understand the limits before the next expansion happens.

    Why this matters in Bend

    Bend has already considered or approved multiple related technology systems over time.

    That does not prove a problem by itself.

    But it does show why residents should ask how all of these systems connect, whether alternatives were seriously evaluated, and what would happen if the City later wanted different pricing, stronger privacy protections, or more independent technical control.

    Vendor lock-in is not only a procurement question.

    It is also a transparency and governance question.

    What better contract oversight would look like

    If Bend wants useful technology without becoming overly dependent on one vendor ecosystem, contracts should protect the public interest.

    That can include:

    • clear exit clauses,
    • data portability requirements,
    • limits on automatic renewals,
    • public review before major expansions,
    • independent audits of enabled features and system settings, and
    • Council approval before materially new capabilities are activated.

    Those are not anti-technology ideas.

    They are basic governance safeguards.

    The real question

    The question is not whether Bend should use one vendor or another.

    The question is whether Bend has enough public oversight before the technology ecosystem becomes too large, too expensive, and too embedded to easily change.

    Vendor lock-in is not just a budget issue.

    It is a democracy issue.

    When public safety technology becomes hard to leave, hard to audit, and hard for residents to understand, public oversight becomes weaker.

    That is why Bend should address vendor lock-in now, before future expansions become automatic.

    Further reading

    Series links

  • What Police Technology Has Bend Already Considered or Purchased?

    What Police Technology Has Bend Already Considered or Purchased?

    Part 2 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    Before Bend residents can have a useful conversation about police surveillance oversight, we need to understand what technology the City has already approved, discussed, or bundled into larger contracts.

    This is not about assuming bad intent.

    It is about making the public record easier to understand.

    Over the past several years, Bend has moved from body-worn cameras into a broader police technology ecosystem involving vehicle cameras, cloud evidence storage, drone software, real-time information tools, third-party video playback, investigation software, and bundled Axon subscriptions.

    That is why this conversation should not be reduced to a simple question like, “Should police have cameras?”

    The better question is:

    What systems has Bend adopted, and what public rules govern the data those systems create?

    Body-worn cameras and Evidence.com

    In April 2021, Bend City Council considered a five-year agreement with Axon for body-worn cameras, associated hardware, analytical software, training, and digital evidence storage, with a contract amount not to exceed $1,038,996.

    The City’s issue summary said full implementation would mean every officer would be equipped with a body-worn camera during their shift, video recordings would be stored, and the Deschutes County District Attorney’s Office would have the ability to receive the information.

    That matters because body cameras are not only recording devices. They also create records that must be stored, accessed, shared, retained, and governed.

    Fleet cameras in police vehicles

    In July 2022, Bend City Council approved a five-year, $679,500 contract with Axon for fleet cameras in Bend Police vehicles.

    The City described the contract as covering purchase and installation of cameras, software, and video storage.

    This is important because fleet cameras can be more than dashboard video. Depending on the hardware, software, and enabled features, vehicle camera systems can interact with evidence storage, metadata, automated review tools, and potentially other software capabilities.

    That is exactly why public policy should focus on capabilities, retention, access, and auditing — not just the word “camera.”

    Fusus real-time information software

    In March 2023, Bend City Council considered a three-year agreement with Fusus Inc. for software and associated hardware to view public and community video sources for incident situational awareness and investigations, with a contract amount not to exceed $230,000.

    The City’s issue summary described Fusus as a real-time crime center platform designed to consolidate video and other information sources.

    It said Fusus could bring together public and private video systems, community tips, community text notifications, Computer Aided Dispatch, unmanned aircraft video, Live 911 information, body-worn cameras, in-car cameras, a community camera registry, a CJIS-compliant video evidence vault, and video live links for 911 callers.

    That is a much broader system than a single camera.

    It is a platform for gathering, viewing, and coordinating multiple information sources in one place.

    Axon Air and drone software

    In February 2024, Bend considered additional Axon Air software licenses for its drone program.

    The issue summary said Bend Police had been using Axon Air software since 2022 for drone support and remote viewing capabilities, and that the department wanted additional pilot and drone licenses.

    It also stated that Bend Police had been using Axon services since 2021 as a unified platform to better track deployment, usage, and results of police actions.

    That phrase — unified platform — is important.

    It shows the direction of travel: not isolated tools, but integration of multiple police technologies into one vendor ecosystem.

    2024 Axon bundled contract

    In October 2024, Bend City Council considered a five-year Axon Officer Safety Plan 10 Premium subscription.

    The meeting minutes state that Council authorized a five-year contract with Axon for Taser hardware, virtual reality hardware and software, digital video recorder playback support, and investigation support software, for a total amount not to exceed $2,555,786.51.

    The minutes also identify the new bundled products and services as Investigate Pro, Third-Party Video Playback, and Virtual Reality training.

    This is the clearest example of why residents need a public inventory.

    Once products are bundled together, it becomes harder for the public to understand which tools are active, which are planned, which are optional, and which could be expanded later.

    Automated traffic enforcement cameras

    Separate from the Axon materials, Bend has also moved forward with automated traffic enforcement.

    The City says the program uses cameras to detect red-light running and speeding at various intersections.

    This is a different type of camera program, but it belongs in the same public conversation because it raises the same basic governance questions:

    • What data is collected?
    • Who operates the system?
    • How long is the data retained?
    • Who can access it?
    • What rules prevent secondary use?

    Why this matters

    Looked at separately, each item may sound narrow:

    • A body camera contract.
    • A fleet camera contract.
    • A drone software license.
    • A real-time information platform.
    • A video playback tool.
    • An investigation software tool.
    • A traffic enforcement camera program.

    But viewed together, they show a larger pattern: Bend is building a police technology environment made of cameras, cloud storage, software subscriptions, vendor platforms, and integrated data systems.

    That does not mean the City should abandon useful tools.

    It does mean residents deserve a clear, public inventory.

    The first step toward meaningful oversight is simple:

    Tell residents what systems exist.

    Selected source documents

    Series links

  • This Is Not Just About Cameras

    This Is Not Just About Cameras

    Part 1 of the Bend Surveillance Oversight series.

    Most people hear “police cameras” and imagine a simple device: a body camera on an officer, a camera in a patrol car, or a license plate reader mounted near a road.

    Cameras are a tool of modern policing, but modern policing was never just about cameras.

    They are often part of a much larger technology ecosystem involving cloud storage, evidence management software, artificial intelligence tools, automated license plate readers, vehicle cameras, drones, real-time crime center platforms, third-party vendors, and future software features that may be added after the original purchase.

    That distinction matters.

    A camera records what happens in front of it. A connected surveillance system can collect data, store it, search it, analyze it, share it, and combine it with other systems. Once that happens, the public policy question changes.

    The question is no longer only:

    Should police have cameras?

    The better question is:

    What rules govern the data those cameras create?

    For example:

    • Where is the data stored?
    • How long is it kept?
    • Who can search it?
    • Are searches logged?
    • Can outside agencies access it?
    • Can vendors access it?
    • Can new AI or biometric features be activated later?
    • Does the City Council have to approve expansions?
    • Are residents told when capabilities change?

    These are not anti-police questions.

    They are basic public oversight questions.

    Body cameras, patrol vehicle cameras, and evidence systems can serve legitimate public safety and accountability purposes. But when those systems are connected to vendor-controlled cloud platforms, AI tools, automated license plate readers, and broader data-sharing networks, the public deserves clear rules before the technology expands.

    This is especially important because cities often start with one tool and later add more tools from the same vendor.

    A city may begin with body cameras, then add fleet cameras, then cloud evidence storage, then license plate readers, then drones, then AI report-writing tools, then real-time crime center software.

    Each step may be presented as a small upgrade.

    But together, those upgrades can create a powerful surveillance infrastructure.

    That is why the issue is not just the camera.

    It is the ecosystem.

    Bend residents should not have to dig through dense procurement packets, legal agreements, and technical appendices to understand what surveillance tools are being used or considered.

    The City should provide a plain-language public inventory of police technology systems, including hardware, software, cloud storage, AI tools, third-party vendors, data retention rules, data-sharing rules, audit procedures, and any future capabilities that can be activated through software.

    This does not require the City to abandon useful technology.

    It simply requires public oversight to keep pace with the technology being purchased.

    Before Bend expands police surveillance systems, residents should be able to answer a simple question:

    Are these tools governed by clear public rules, or are we relying mostly on vendor assurances and internal department policies?

    That is the conversation Bend should have now, before the system becomes larger, more expensive, and harder to change.

    Further reading

    Series links